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THE U.K. ECONOMY AND THE E.E.C. 
I intend this evening to discuss a sul ject which is, 
. \ 
I believe, vital for the future both of the Jnited Kingdom 
and the whole of free Europe. I 'tvant to ta~ .i< about the 
development of an economically integrated European Community 
and about the defence of Europe, and to shov.,. tqat the t¥70 
are intimately linked. Some may feel that I am trespassing 
onto forbidden ground and I am certainly interpreting the 
title of this talk in a far reaching fashion. I do so in a 
personal capacity and I am sure that it is right to draw 
• 
these matters to public attention. 
Western Europe is at present. facing t'tvO great 
challenges. On the one hand there is the uninhibited 
Soviet anns build up and the aggressiveness of Soviet 
policy as shown by the invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan. There are also mounting tensions in other 
parts of the world that could threaten Europe's supplies 
of vital raw materials. On the other, there is the 
/combination 
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combination of the worst recession since the 1930s and 
the loss of international competitivity that ch?racterises 
so many of our basic industries. 
In the next stage of European development the link 
between industrial recovery and the needs of the defence 
sector must be_ recognised. So must the need to forge a 
closer link between different aspects of policy. I 
believe the German Foreign Minister, Herr Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, is right when he talks in the same breath of 
the need to develop Community policies flowing from the 
Treaties of Rome and Paris lvith the co-ordination of 
security policy and the development of a common European 
foreign policy. 
Today many are more often conscious of the failing~ 
of the Co~unity than its achievements, more aware of the 
squabbles between its Governments than the degree of 
cooperation, consultation, and solidarity which they 
display. Some are even tempted to suggest that if the 
Con~unity did not exist we could cooperate more easily, 
which is like saying that if Parliament did not exist we 
would have no political problems. Differences do exist, 
as it is natural they should, but in the Community we 
have the institutions and the mechanisms through which 
they can be, and are, resolved. 
/PROGRESS IN THE COMMUNITY 
r 
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PROGRESS IN THE CON}llJNITY 
The degree of integration and interdependence of 
the economies of Corrununity Member States is nmv far 
advanced. A tariff-free market of 260 million consumers 
has been established and progress has been made in the 
removal of technical barriers which place obstacles in 
the way of those wishing to do business throughout the 
Community. Trade within the Community is for most 
Member States the most important element of their trad~ng 
activity. Industrial structures, marketing operations, 
and patterns of investment both .from outside and from 
within the Co~nity are in large part geared to the 
existence of this market. 
In the UK there has been a marked increase in trade 
with other Member States over the last decade, with the · 
Community taking 43% of British exports last year, compared 
with 32% in 1973, the year we joined the Community. West 
Germany has now replaced the United States as our major 
export market, and most of the other Member States are 
among our top ten export markets. Our export/import ratio 
with the Community has also shown a steadily improving 
pattern for the last five years, from 70% in 1975 to 86% 
in 1979. Last year the UK achieved a net surplus of 
£700M on its intra-Community trade on visibles, in addition 
to our substantial surplus on private invisibles .• 
/A similar 
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A similar picture emerges if one looks at the British 
trading performance in manufactured goods. In 1979 the 
t increase over 1978 of manufactured exports to the Community 
t 
was more than four times the increase in manufactured 
exports to the rest of the lvorld (21% against 5%). Between 
1972 and 1980 the value of British exports to the Community 
increased by 480% while for the USA the figure was 234%, 
for Japan 237% and for the rest of the world 295%. Or, to 
put it another way, the UK export/import ratio in 
manufactures with Japan declined from .48% to 28% in the 
·years 1973 to 1980, from 96io to 66% lvith North America 
over the same period, and remained more or less constant 
with the Conmrunity - 87% in 1973 and 86% in 19-80. 
The evidence shows that though British industry has 
not done as well in the Community as was originally hoped 
it has done much better there than anywhere else. I should, 
• 
of course, like to see the performance of British industry 
in non-Community markets improve. The better it can do 
throughout the world the more happy I shall be. But I 
think it is clear that the future success of British 
industry is now primarily dependent on its access to and 
its ability to succeed in the other Member States of the 
European Community. If it cannot succeed in the Community 
· · where there are no tariff barriers and where non tariff 
restrictions are being removed, it is difficult to see how 
/it can succeed 
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it can succeed anywhere else. The same applies with 
equal force to the industries of other Member States. 
Against this background it is not surprising that 
there is a developing process of cooperation and 
co-ordination of general economic, fiscal and monetary 
policies at the highest political and official levels 
within the Community. The establishment of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 and its remar'P :1.ble su,ccess 
to date in creating a zone of relative monel 1ry stability 
' in Europe against a background of disturbed .economic 
conditions and wide fluctuations in non-EMS currencies 
such as the yen and the dollar is one qf the best known 
aspects of this co-ordination. Sterling, which has 
unfortunately remained outside the EMS exchange rate 
mechanism, has also been subject to wide fluctuations, 
with adver~e effects on both domestic monetary policy and 
external trade. Full sterling participation in EMS would, 
I believ~, improve the prospects for a realistic and stable 
sterling exchange rate and a wider zone of monetary 
stability in Europe. No one stands to gain more from this 
than British industry. 
Less well-known than the EMS are the other associated 
steps which are taken to develop a complementary approach 
among Community Members to questions of inflation, monetary 
/targets, 
\ 
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targets, budgetary policy and general economic management. 
At the political level the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
his counterparts meet regularly .in the Council of Ministers 
to discuss economic policy, and Heads of Government meeting 
in the European Council regularly consider reports on 
economic developments and policy options submitted to them 
by the European Commission. Supporting these there are 
several bodies meeting on a formal basis: a Committee of 
Governors of Central·Banks meets to discuss intervention 
policy, relations with third currencies, domestic monetary 
trends, and developments within the EMS. The ~1onetary 
Committee complements at official level the lvork of the 
Governors on monetary policy and the EMS. The Co-ordination 
Group on Short-Term Economic and Financial Policies has the 
task of keeping under review the day-to-day development of 
economic policies in Member States and of ensuring adequate 
consultation when changes are proposed which could have 
repercussions in other Member States. The Economic Policy 
Committe~ consisting of senior economic officials seeks to 
develop common lines of general policy and advises the 
Commission in its preparation of documents for discussions 
by Ministers and Heads of Government. 
All these activities are based on the recognition 
that such co-ordination of policy facilitates the 
tackling of domestic problems and is 
/essential 
r 
\ 
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essential if the interdependent unit 'vhich the ConnnunitY. has 
become is to participate effectively in a wider international 
forum involving the US and Japan. The procedur.es do not lvork 
perfectly. Sometimes Member States are drawn apart by 
domestic pressures. On other occasions they take too long 
to bring their positions into line. But in a pragmatic and 
undramatic fashion the system 'vorks and is improving. 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 
In the field of industrial cooperation, however, 
progress has so far been disappointing. Most of the effort 
has been concentrated on fighting rearguard actions to 
defend declining industries. The recent steel·crisis 
measures, and the MUlti-Fibre Arrangement (shortly to be 
re-negotiated) are examples of important and useful 
Comnunity activities, but they are essentially negative 
successes which buy time and they cannot indefinitely 
postpone the need to become competitive on the world 
market. Policies to assist old industries in difficulty, 
if they are not simply to lock up human and financial 
resources and undermine our capacity to adapt, must be 
combined with policies for those industries that will meet 
the needs and serve the markets of the future. It is there 
that the jobs will be. 
So far Member States seem prepared only to turn 
/towards 
•:i 
,. 
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towards the Community when they have clearly failed to 
solve a problem themselves. Community industrial 
cooperation seems so~etimes to be viewed like a visit to 
the dentist - umvelcorne and postponed as long as possible 
until there is no alternative. In the positive development 
of successful high technology industries, on which the 
future of European living standards depends, we have so 
far failed to achieve the degree of cooperation necessary 
or to exploit the opportunities of a European-lvide market. 
We still operate too much on the basis of self-contained 
and competing national units. 
The result is deeply discouraging. Europe is falling 
behind its major industrial competitors and faces a real 
prospect of industrial decline in which it is squeezed 
between advanced industrial countries such as the United 
. ' 
States and Japan and the new industrialized countries who 
• 
can now produce more competitively the goods on which our 
p~st industrial success has been built. 
In 1965 the Community exported 40% more electronic-
based products than it imported. In 1976 "tve only broke 
even, while in the same year the Japanese exported nine 
times as much of such products as they imported. Our 
balance of trade in computers is getting worse in the 
/fir.st half 
' . 
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~irst half of 1980 we had a deficit of $1~ billion with 
the USA alone. In patents, an indicator of our innovative 
propensity, the number taken out by Community nationals 
dropped by 20% between 1965 and 1977, while the number 
taken out by the Japanese increased by 400%. 
To reverse this trend will require action on many 
fronts, which should be co-ordinated within the framework 
of the Community. We must exploit our continental market 
by promoting common technology standards, harmonising 
regulatory activities, establishing common information 
networks and supporting research and development on a 
larger scale. We must develop a genuine Community-wide 
market in capital and financial services and make it much 
easier for our companies to operate on a Europe-wide 
basis in whatever manner is most appropriate to the 
circumstan~es of the individual concerns. We need,· in 
sum, a more co-ordinated application of governmental 
~ctivities and a wider opportunity for private enterprise. 
A·key role should be played by government 
procurement. In all countries this instrument is used 
as an arm of industrial policy. That is true of the US 
and Japan as well as in Europe. In the fields of advanced 
technology and large scale capital equipment it is 
particularly important. Within the Community there is 
/considerable 
., 
·:' 
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considerable scope for the procurement programmes of the 
ten Governments to be established on the basis of common 
criteria with complementary objectives and open to. 
companies from all Member States. Obviously they would 
not all be the same. Their scale and interests are too 
diverse. But they should be designed and regulated in 
such a way as to secure benefits for the industries 
concerned on a Europe-wide basis. The achievement of this 
aim will require careful negotiation as eacr Member State 
must feel that in opening up its own market ~t is securing 
commensurate opportunities for its national companies in 
l 
others. 
THE DEFENCE DIHENSION 
It is at this point that it becomes difficult to draw 
a dividing line bet'iveen industrial policy and defence. The 
• 
same governments and the same companies are involved in both. 
Moreover, just as European industry needs the backing of 
, 
co-ordinated government procurement programmes, so 
governments need to co-ordinate their defence procurement 
to a far greater extent than hitherto. 
All European countries, however firm their commitment 
to the Western Alliance, are finding it difficult to 
maintain and modernize their.armed forces. For even the 
\ 
richest and most dedicated the costs ~re becoming·prohibitive. 
Yet ~ith the Soviet Unio~ constantly increasing its capacity 
for aggression there should be no question of Europe failing 
to meet its defence obligations~ 
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Much of the defence equipment that is needed involves 
rechnology which pushes at the.limits of scientific and 
engineering development. In the aerospace, electronics 
and shipbuilding industries, to name only three, defence 
provides both a major source of orders - 60% of aircraft 
industry sales within the Community - and an essential 
stimulus to the technology advance that is essential if 
they are to remain competitive in world markets. 
The need for better European cooperat1~n in defence 
equipment procurement was one of the main rr:ommendations 
of the report on European Union produced in ;1975 by 
\ 
Mr Tindemans, the then Belgian Prime ~unister. The 
European Parliament has also produced some thoughtful and 
' 
serious reports on the subject, most recently that of 
Mr Klepsch in 1978. The reaction of governments has so 
far been mixed. It has sometimes been claimed that any 
activity b~ the Community in this field is impossible 
because the Community is not a defence institution. It 
is also sometimes argued that all efforts to improve 
equipment procurement cooperation should be left to NATO 
or to the other organisations which are associated with 
it, particularly the Independent European Programme Group. 
In my view, it is a mistake to view this issue in 
purely institutional terms. Of the existing Members of 
the Community, all except Ireland are Members of the 
/North 
... ., 
• 
or·· 
J 
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North Atlantic Alliance, and of the t1vo countries 'tvhich 
a~e negotiating for membership; Portugal is already a 
Member of NATO and Spain may well become one soon. All 
these countries share a common view of how Europe's 
defence should be assured, namely in partnership with the 
United States of America and Canada, but with a strong 
European defence capability as well - broadly speaking, 
the concept first elaborated by President Kennedy of the \ 
twin pillars of North Atlantic defence. In addition, all 
the European members of the Alliance are con nitted to the 
maintenance of a strong and sophisticated &·copean deferice 
industry able to compete, in broad terms if ?ot necessarily 
in every single individual field, ,.vith ·that 1of the United 
States. 
INSTITUTIONAL H1PLICATIONS 
By comparison with this underlying consensus on 
defence phi1osophy, the choice of institu~ional arrangements 
is of much less significance and ought to be treated as a 
practical~problem. Though the Community as such is not 
involved institutionally in defence matters, its members 
form the core of the European arm of NATO. Once the 
Community is enlarged to 12, only Norway, Turkey and 
Iceland, of NATO's European members, 'tvill not belong to it. 
Moreover, as Mrs Thatcher pointed out in 1978 in a notable 
speech in Brussels in which she c.alled for closer co-ordination 
between ~mrnunity and NATO affairs, the Headquarters of 
/NATO and 
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NATO and .the principal site of the Community's institutions 
are in the same city. It is wrong therefore to talk, as is 
sometimes done, as though the Community and the European 
pillar of NATO are worlds apart. It is for the most part 
the same countries and governments who comprise the two. 
.· 
If therefore there are practical advantages in 
involving th~ Community, or some of its organs, in defence 
industrial matters, there is surely no need :o raise 
doctrinal objections to this. In my viel;-1, t 1ch advantages 
I 
\ 
may well become apparent. The Corrrrnunity ha"· responsibilities 
\ 
in the industrial field, for example on industrial policy 
generally, on state aids to indust~~, and on research in 
certain areas of high technology. The Commission has 
within its services a supply of expertise and experience 
in some of these areas. Could not this expertise and the.se 
responsibilities be of relevance to European cooperation in 
the defence industries as well as in the civil industries? 
In putting this question, I am not advocating a 
dirigiste approach since I do not favour this in the 
defence industrial sector any more than I do in the civil 
sector. The impetus for industrial reorganisation and 
integration has to come from the companies and industries 
concerned. But the Community, and particularly the 
I Commission, 
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-Commission, has a role to play as a catalyst. Governments 
and parliaments rightly look to the Commission to be active 
in the industrial field. If we are to develop European 
industry, particularly the modern high technology industries, 
on a Community-wide basis in order to be able to hold our 
o~vn against American and Japanese competition, then we must 
accept that the defence and defence related industries will , 
be involved as well. We cannot draw an artificial dividing 
line between the civilian and defence indus rial sectors. 
More systematic European cooperation in defence and 
security matters is in any case likely to flow from the 
development of political cooperation among the Community's 
Member States. British Governments have traditionally and 
rightly seen the political strengthening of the Community 
as one of the prime assets of membership. In the short 
term there is a need to improve the practical arrangements 
• 
and procedures through which political cooperation takes 
place. Lord Carrington, in a speech made in Hamburg last 
year, set out some ideas for achieving this. Since then 
Herr Genscher has produced a proposal that the Member States 
of the Community should commit themselves in some kind of 
formal declaration ·to a more ~ystematic co-ordination of 
. their foreign policies. Signor Colombo, the Italian 
Foreign Minister, in a speech in Florence in January this 
year, also suggested that Europe should provide a more 
co-ordinated and effective contribution to its own security 
and should develop its institutional arrangements accordingly. 
/ In practical 
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I~ practical t~rms the distinction between political 
cooperation a~d discussion in the Council of Ninisters for 
which the Council has a responsibility under the Treaty is 
of course not rigid. Already, we have seen the dividing 
line between the two become blurred. For example the 
Connnunity has, during the last fe'tv years, discussed policy 
on agricultural exports to the Soviet Union, sanctions 
against Iran and aid for Afghan refugees in a manner which 
combined elements both of political coopera ion and of 
institutional Treaty activity. The Connnuni y was able, 
without anyone nit-picking over the precise.' frame't\70rk 
\ 
within which discussion was taking place, to take decisions 
on these issues. Indeed, 'tvhen the Coil'II!IDnity 's· Heads of 
Government meet at the European Council they are able to 
combine political cooperation and institutional Treaty 
activity most successfully. There is no reason therefore 
why Foreign Ministers should not more regularly do so as 
• 
well. 
If the commitment to political cooperation is 
strengthened, it will inevitably spill over into the 
security field. One of the Connnunity's earliest successes 
in foreign policy c·oordination was in the preparations for 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Not 
only did the 9 (as they then were) achieve a connnon 
approach of their own. They also managed successfully to 
doyetail their policy within the North Atlantic Alliance. 
/Indeed, 
• 
\. 
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Indeed, the CSCE was a good example of how,, when it acts 
together, Europe can be not merely a twin partner but a 
dominant partner within the Alliance on an issue where 
specific European security interests are involved. 
There will almost certainly be other security 
related issues in the future where the Community will 
wish to take its own common view. In time Community. 
Ministers may even develop the practice of political 
cooperation to the point 'vhere it involves issues of 
defence as well as foreign policy. This would in my 
personal opinion be a welcome development rather than 
one to be nervous of. Indeed, it is something which 
is surely inevitable. If political cooperation is to 
mean anything at all, it cannot be entirely d~vorced 
from the defence and security fields. It is nonsense 
to expect that Community Heads of Government or Foreign 
Ministers,will discuss happily a common policy towards 
the Middle East or Southern Africa but decline to 
involve themselves in the problems of the security of 
their own continent. 
I It is, of 
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It is, of course, important that any collective 
European policy-making on defence should not be divorced 
from the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. But 
when European Defence Hinisters meet in the framework of 
the Eu·rogroup at NATO Headquarters in Evere they represent 
to a great extent the same governments "tvhose Foreign 
Ninisters meet dmm the road at. the Charlemagne. The 
problems of resource pressures, defence equipment costs 
and the possible need for greater specialisation and more 
interdependence among European countries in the defence 
field will increase in the 1980s. These issues have 
great political significance for Europe's future. They are 
not merely problems of military doctrine or operational 
planning. If the Community is to develop its "full potential, 
and by this I do not imply any particular form of new 
structure, whether federal, confederal or whatever, it 
cannot but recognise the significance of its security p~licy • 
• 
CONCLUSION 
This implies both challenges and risks. If the 
Community continues to concentrate on wrangling internally 
about the structure of its budget or the relative amount it 
spends on certain types of policies, there is bound to be 
a damaging spin-off effect on Europe's ability to organise 
its defence in a coherent fashion. If, on the other hand, 
we succeed in restructuring the ·budget to 
/reflect 
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~e£1~ct the new priorities oi; the 1980s, and if we can put 
into ~ffect common pol:l.cie$ for maintaining Europe's 
! ~. t.ndus.trial competitivity, then there may well be gains in 
I 
terns ·o.f cost effectiveness and ra..tionalisation in the 
defence field too. 
To say this is, l repeat, not to argue for 
institutional change simply fo:r: the sake of :tt. I am not 
suggesting that we should discuss defence issues through 
CORE:PER. when there at"e. b~tter qualified Pem.anent 
· ReJ?resentattves at NAl'O to do so. But :lt :ls s1.,1rely 
natul."al for t:he Conum.m:tty t s Heads of Government 'tvhen they 
address Europe's problems at the Eu~Qpean Council to 
consider defence and se.cu~ity i.ssue.s~ It may be that the 
i. 
follo'tv"'"UP action to their disclJssion will take place at 
NATO Headquarters rather than !n the Charlemagne or 
Be.r~aymont~ This would have the advantage of providing 
a link with countries outside the Comrnun:lty with whom 
the. Com:munity 'tvishes to have closer 't'elat:tons, 
' 
In recent years we have. grown accus.tomed to thinking 
of Community affairs and defence a$ :tf they are distinct 
and unrelated subjects. But as the President of the 
European Commission, Mr Gaston Thorn, recently said: 
11 the. oversimplified sepaxation of economic policy and 
defence is absurd". Such founding fathers of the 
/Conmrunity 
. . 
r 
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Community as Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak, who indeed 
went on to become Secretary General of NATO, would have 
agreed. The links between defence and ~vhat have 
traditionally been regarded as Community affiars should 
be closer and must be so if the Community is to rise to 
the challenges that now confront it. We need to accept 
that there is a Community dimension to Europe's defence, 
particularly defence industrial, problems, and we should 
not allow preconceived institutional constraints to 
prevent us from seeking the most cost-effective and 
·politically natural means of tackling them • 
• 
• 
J 
